From Maintaining Order To Coming Out on Top: The Changing US Strategic Discourse
At a recent congressional hearing, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that “[t]he United States Government is not a charity. We are not here to play social worker. We are here to win.” [https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-before-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-on-the-fy27-department-of-state-budget-request][PS] The remark quickly sparked discussion, but if viewed as little more than a political slogan, the underlying shift in U.S. strategic discourse it reflects risks being overlooked.
For decades, U.S. foreign policy has embraced the preservation of the international order, democratic values, cooperation with allies and free trade as its guiding narrative. Whether in promoting multilateral cooperation, emphasizing a rules-based international order or maintaining its global influence through international institutions, they have been defining features of American diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.
But recent years have seen the emergence of a gradual shift in the focus of official U.S. discourse.
From the Trump administration’s introduction of “America First” during its first term to the continued emphasis on manufacturing reshoring, supply chain security, tariff policy, technological competition and industrial self-reliance during Trump’s second term, it is clear that the boundaries between U.S. foreign, security, economic and industrial policy have gradually blurred, and national interests have once again become the core of policy discourse.
To some extent, Rubio’s description of the U.S. government’s role as “We are here to win” reflects this shift in thinking. It is worth noting that this does not mean the United States has started pursuing national interests; rather, it means that, whereas U.S. policy legitimacy was formerly more often articulated through the language of democracy, human rights, international institutions or global governance, it is now more directly framed in terms of national interest, competition and winning or losing.
In other words, U.S. interests themselves may not have changed; what has changed is more likely the way those interests are expressed.
A look back at U.S. foreign policy over the past decade or so shows that both Democratic and Republican administrations have attached great importance to technological superiority, economic security, military deterrence and cooperation with allies, differing only in their policy narratives. Democratic administrations tend to legitimize cooperation through the international order and shared values. The Trump administration, on the other hand, has more directly integrated diplomacy, tariffs, industrial policy, supply chains and national security into a single toolkit for national competition, with whether they serve U.S. interests becoming a key criterion for policy evaluation.
Therefore, rather than discussing Rubio’s remarks themselves, it is the ongoing evolution of U.S. strategic discourse that merits closer attention. As “maintaining order” gradually gives way to “coming out on top,” national interests will more directly become the core narrative of foreign policy, and the connections between economic, technological, industrial and security policies are likely to grow closer as a result.
For Taiwan, the real focus may not be on the rhetoric used by U.S. officials, but on understanding the definition of U.S. interests and how these interests shape its foreign policy and regional strategy. A more accurate understanding of the interest structure behind U.S. strategic adjustments can only be gained by continuing to observe changes in policy objectives and the structures of those interests — not by fixating on the statements of individual politicians.
The author is a policy and strategy researcher for the Asia-Pacific Security and Strategy Research Studio.
For decades, U.S. foreign policy has embraced the preservation of the international order, democratic values, cooperation with allies and free trade as its guiding narrative. Whether in promoting multilateral cooperation, emphasizing a rules-based international order or maintaining its global influence through international institutions, they have been defining features of American diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.
But recent years have seen the emergence of a gradual shift in the focus of official U.S. discourse.
From the Trump administration’s introduction of “America First” during its first term to the continued emphasis on manufacturing reshoring, supply chain security, tariff policy, technological competition and industrial self-reliance during Trump’s second term, it is clear that the boundaries between U.S. foreign, security, economic and industrial policy have gradually blurred, and national interests have once again become the core of policy discourse.
To some extent, Rubio’s description of the U.S. government’s role as “We are here to win” reflects this shift in thinking. It is worth noting that this does not mean the United States has started pursuing national interests; rather, it means that, whereas U.S. policy legitimacy was formerly more often articulated through the language of democracy, human rights, international institutions or global governance, it is now more directly framed in terms of national interest, competition and winning or losing.
In other words, U.S. interests themselves may not have changed; what has changed is more likely the way those interests are expressed.
A look back at U.S. foreign policy over the past decade or so shows that both Democratic and Republican administrations have attached great importance to technological superiority, economic security, military deterrence and cooperation with allies, differing only in their policy narratives. Democratic administrations tend to legitimize cooperation through the international order and shared values. The Trump administration, on the other hand, has more directly integrated diplomacy, tariffs, industrial policy, supply chains and national security into a single toolkit for national competition, with whether they serve U.S. interests becoming a key criterion for policy evaluation.
Therefore, rather than discussing Rubio’s remarks themselves, it is the ongoing evolution of U.S. strategic discourse that merits closer attention. As “maintaining order” gradually gives way to “coming out on top,” national interests will more directly become the core narrative of foreign policy, and the connections between economic, technological, industrial and security policies are likely to grow closer as a result.
For Taiwan, the real focus may not be on the rhetoric used by U.S. officials, but on understanding the definition of U.S. interests and how these interests shape its foreign policy and regional strategy. A more accurate understanding of the interest structure behind U.S. strategic adjustments can only be gained by continuing to observe changes in policy objectives and the structures of those interests — not by fixating on the statements of individual politicians.
The author is a policy and strategy researcher for the Asia-Pacific Security and Strategy Research Studio.
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